Propositional cue-control 8 together, and the chocolate picture was a close up of a chocolate block. Although these cues will have been paired with a range of beer and chocolate outcomes in the past, they should never have been paired with the specific textual outcomes earned by the response. Thus, for a PIT effect to occur, the beer stimulus (for example) must retrieve the general category of beer, which generalises to retrieve the beer outcome 'One beer point' and subsequently primes the response associated with this specific outcome. It is possible that the indirect relationship between the S and the R (mediated by a chain of two related Os) in the PIT test favours a propositional process over a more automatic O-R mechanism. By contrast, in Elsner and Hommel's (2001) demonstration of the ideomotor mechanism, the S presented in the PIT test was the O with which the R had been paired during training. Therefore, a more direct test for the contribution of O-R links in choice of valued rewards would be to present the actual outcome O with which the response R was paired during instrumental training. Perhaps these conditions would be better suited to demonstrate the operation of an automatic ideomotor process.
In summary, there is reaction time evidence that neutral outcomes (tones) can prime responses with which they have been paired in an apparently automatic fashion (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) . These results are consistent with the operation of an O-R or ideomotor mechanism. The O-R mechanism has also been suggested to account for choice of valued rewards in PIT (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Eder & Hommel, 2013) .
There is, however, little direct evidence for the role of an O-R link mechanism in choice of the valued rewards typically used in PIT tasks. Moreover, recent PIT experiments using such rewards suggest that cue control is mediated by a propositional process (Hogarth et al., 2014) ; participants appear to interpret the presence of the cue as indicative of which response-outcome relation will be effective. The aim of the current experiments was to further explore whether stimuli can exert automatic control over instrumental responding, using a task that might encourage greater expression of the O-R link mechanism. Experiment 1 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 10
Participants
Fifty seven participants (22 males, 35 females), aged between 18 and 48 (M = 21.04, S.D. = 4.94), completed the experiment in exchange for course credits. At the start of the experiment, participants were randomly allocated to the instruction or no instruction condition. Participants provided informed consent and the experiment was approved by the School of Psychology ethics committee at Plymouth University.
Apparatus
The task was programmed in E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.; pstnet.com) and was presented in an individual laboratory cubicle on a 22-inch computer monitor. A 660ml bottle of Beck's beer and a 45 gram Cadbury's Dairy Milk chocolate bar served as the physical reinforcers that participants believed they could earn points towards during the task.
Procedure
After providing demographic information, participants were shown the bottle of beer and the chocolate bar and were told that they could try to win them during the experiment. On-screen instructions read, "In this task, you can earn the beer and chocolate in front of you by pressing the left or right arrow keys. You will only win rewards on some trials. Press any key to begin." These rewards were hidden when the task began.
Concurrent choice training.
The computer task began with 24 trials of concurrent choice training, in which the response-outcome relationships were established. Each response was paired with either beer or chocolate, and this was counterbalanced between subjects. Each trial began with a symbolic representation of the choice, centrally presented on-screen as "← or →". After a left or right arrow key response was made, this was immediately replaced by the statement "You earn" and a picture of either beer (two glasses of beer being 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 11 clashed together) or chocolate (a close up of a chocolate block). Each outcome was scheduled to be available on 50% of the trials, which were randomly distributed throughout training. When subjects selected a response for an outcome that was not available, they were presented with the text, "You win nothing" and a grey (blank) rectangle stimulus. This stimulus subsequently served as the blank stimulus in the transfer test. All outcomes were presented for 1500ms and were followed by an intertrial interval (ITI) that varied randomly between 750 and 1250ms.
Contingency knowledge test.
A short contingency knowledge test followed the concurrent choice training phase. Participants were asked two questions, "Which key earned beer (or chocolate), the left or the right arrow key? Please choose carefully". These questions were randomly ordered and were separated by a 750-1250ms ITI.
Test phase. Participants then completed the test phase, after reading the following on-screen instructions: "In this part of the task, you can earn beer and chocolate by pressing the left or right arrow key in the same way as before. You will only be told how many of each reward you have earned at the end of the experiment. Also, sometimes a picture of beer or chocolate will be presented before you choose the left or right arrow key. Press any key to begin." Participants in the instruction condition were also told, "Pictures do not indicate which arrow key is more likely to be rewarded!" This appeared both on the initial instruction page (beneath the main instructions) and also at the bottom of the screen continuously throughout the test period. Each trial started with the presentation of the beer, chocolate or blank outcome pictures that were used during concurrent choice training. These were presented for 3s before an instrumental response (also represented on-screen as "← or →"), was required. Responding, tested in the presence of the pictures, was not time limited. The three picture cues were scheduled to be presented 16 times each throughout the test phase (48 trials in total). There were eight cycles of six trials. Every six-trial cycle contained two trials of each cue presented in a random order.
The trials were separated by an ITI of 750-1250ms. The dependent variable was the percent choice of the beer key over the chocolate key (where 50% = indifference) in the presence of each stimulus. presented in a random order with the on-screen question, "When this picture was presented, to what extent did you think that the beer (or chocolate) key was more likely to be rewarded?" Participants were required to press a key from 1-7, where 1 and 7 represented "Not at all" and "Very much", respectively. The statements were randomly ordered and were separated by an ITI varying between 350-750ms. Finally, participants were thanked, offered a small chocolate reward and were fully debriefed.
Results
Two participants from the non-instructed group were excluded for failing to correctly report the responseoutcome relationships during the contingency knowledge test, leaving 28 participants in the instructed group, and 27 participants in the non-instructed group. Figure 1 shows the mean percent choice of the beer key versus chocolate key following each of the three pictures (beer, blank and chocolate) within both groups. The cueing effect is indicated by the extent to which beer responses are increased by the presence of the beer picture, and decreased by the presence of the chocolate picture, relative to the "no stimulus" blank condition. The graph indicates that a cueing effect was present in both groups, but was reduced in the instruction group. A mixed ANOVA confirmed this interpretation. There was a main effect of stimulus, F (1, 53) = 78.37, p < .001, but not of instruction, F < 1.
Test phase
There was also an interaction between stimulus and instruction, F (1, 53) = 13.78, p < .001. Furthermore, Propositional cue-control 13 there was a simple effect of stimulus in both the non-instruction, F (1, 53) = 77.53, p < .001, and instruction group, F (1, 53) = 13.46, p < .001. (Figure 1 about here) Figure 2 shows the effect of instruction group on self-reported expectancy of the cued outcome, that is, the extent to which participants expected a beer reward following a beer picture and a chocolate reward following a chocolate picture. The graph suggests that expectancy ratings were not reduced by the instruction. A mixed ANOVA confirmed this, revealing no main effect of instruction group, F < 1. There was a main effect of outcome, F (1, 53) = 7.61, p < .01, however, and a significant interaction between outcome and instruction group, F (1, 53) = 7.61, p < .01. There was a simple effect of outcome in the instruction group, F (1, 53) = 15.49, p < .001, but not in the non-instruction group, F < 1. There was no main effect of instruction group with respect to expectancy reports for either the beer stimulus, F (1, 53) = 1.44, p > .05, or the chocolate stimulus, F < 1, suggesting that neither cueing effect was sensitive to the instruction. One sample t-tests were conducted comparing the average expectancy score of each instruction group to the mid-point value of four. This median value indicates an expectation that both outcomes are equally likely to be rewarded, regardless of the cue. This comparison revealed a significant difference in both the noninstruction, t (26) = 2.89, p < .01, and the instruction condition, t (27) = 3.48, p < .01, suggesting that both groups expected the cued outcome to be rewarded. To further explore the relationship between expectancy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 ratings and the cueing effect, each instruction group was divided into 'high' and 'low' expectancy subgroups.
Expectancy ratings
Subjects scoring above four on the expectancy measure (averaged across outcomes) were assigned to the high expectancy group (N = 41), while all others were classified as low expectancy subjects (N = 14). Figure 3 shows the cueing effect in each instruction and expectancy sub-group. The graph suggests that a cueing effect was only observed in participants who reported high expectancy ratings, and this was reduced in the instructed condition. A three-way ANOVA on the instruction group, expectancy group and stimulus variables revealed a main effect of stimulus, F (1, 102) = 38.21, p < .001, but not of expectancy group, F (1, 51) = 1.47, p > .05, or instruction group, F < 1. There was an interaction between stimulus and instruction group, F (2, 102) = 10.18, p < .001, and between stimulus and expectancy group, F (2, 102) = 29.16, p < .001, but not between the instruction and expectancy groups, F < 1. Finally, there was a three-way interaction between stimulus, instruction and expectancy group, F (2, 102) = 4.34, p < .02.
The significant three-way interaction between stimulus, instruction and expectancy group was further explored with an analysis of simple main effects. Collapsed across instruction groups, there was a large effect of stimulus in the high expectancy group, F (2, 78) = 116.44, p < .001, but not in the low expectancy group, F < 1, indicating that the cueing effect was only present among participants who reported high expectancy ratings. Neither expectancy group showed an effect of instruction, Fs < 1. There was a significant interaction between stimulus and instruction in the high-expectancy group, F (2, 78) = 24.32, p < .001, suggesting that the cueing effect was reduced by the instruction even for participants who reported a high expectancy of the S:R-O contingencies. By contrast, there was no interaction between stimulus and instruction among the lowexpectancy group, F < 1. Furthermore, both the instructed, F (2, 36) = 16.65, p < .001, and non-instructed, F (2, 36) = 146.52, p < .001, groups showed simple effects of stimulus in the high-expectancy group, indicating that a cueing effect was present in both instruction groups. This was not observed in participants reporting low expectancies, regardless of the instruction condition, Fs < 1.11, ps > .36. Propositional cue-control 15
The failure to observe a cueing effect in the low expectancy group prompted a Bayesian analysis on these data.
A beer cueing effect was calculated for each participant by subtracting the percent choice of the beer key on non-cued trials from the percent beer choice on beer-cued trials. Conversely, a chocolate cueing effect was calculated by subtracting the percent beer choice on chocolate-cued trials from the percent beer choice on non-cued trials. The overall cueing effect represents the mean of the beer and chocolate cueing effects. The mean cueing effect (mean=2.23, SEM=2.03) did not significantly differ from zero in the low expectancy group, t (13) = 1.10, p > .05. The alternative hypothesis here predicts a cueing effect in participants who reported low expectancy ratings. That is, the mean cueing effect should be greater than zero. Bayes factors below 0.3 and above 3 are evidence for the null and the alternative hypothesis, respectively, while values in between indicate that the data are insensitive (Dienes, 2011) . Using a uniform distribution ranging from zero to 50 (the maximum plausible cueing effect), we calculated a Bayes factor of 0.16. This is support for the null hypothesis, suggesting that the cueing effect was abolished in participants reporting low expectancy ratings.
( Figure 3 about here) Figure 4 shows a positive correlation between expectancy ratings and the cueing effect (both averaged across beer and chocolate outcomes). Overall reward expectancy strongly correlated with the overall cueing effect, r = .60, p < .001, and this correlation was significant in both the instruction, r = .52, p < .01 and the no instruction, r = .71, p < .001, condition. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 16
In the standard non-instructed group, pictures of beer and chocolate promoted responses that had been followed by those pictures during training -a typical outcome cueing effect. The instructed group were told that the pictures did not indicate which response would be rewarded in the test phase. The cueing effect was significantly reduced, but not eliminated, as a consequence of these instructions. The result is a replication of Hogarth et al.'s (2014) Experiment 3, in which a similar instruction also partially eliminated the PIT effect across the sample as a whole. Collectively, this sensitivity to instructional manipulations indicates that the priming effect seen in both PIT and O-R paradigms is at least partially governed by a propositional process.
Although the cueing effect was reduced in the instructed group, it was not eliminated entirely. This attenuation of the cueing effect is predicted by dual-process models, where the propositional component is sensitive to the instruction but the automatic component is not. However, it is also clear that expectancy ratings were not reduced in the instructed condition; both groups reported a belief that the stimulus signalled which response was more likely to be rewarded. While the propositional approach predicts a tight coupling between expectancy ratings and cueing effects, the dual-process model does not. Indeed, the latter approach would predict a residual cueing effect even amongst participants reporting low expectancies, because the automatic component that drives response selection is independent of conscious expectancies. Further analysis of the expectancy ratings, however, suggested that the cueing effect was completely abolished in participants who reported low expectancy ratings (regardless of the instruction). This was confirmed by the Bayes analysis, which provided support for the null hypothesis. This is consistent with the result reported by Hogarth et al.
(2014), where PIT was abolished only in participants who reported beliefs that were consistent with the instructional manipulation. Furthermore, the current study revealed a positive correlation between the strength of expectancy ratings and the size of the cueing effect in both instruction groups. Together, these data suggest that the cueing effect is mediated by conscious, verbalizable beliefs about the signalling role of the stimulus.
The instruction used in the present study only weakly influenced these beliefs, and so the cueing effect was only partially sensitive to the instruction. Experiment 2 was therefore designed to test whether a stronger 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 instructional manipulation would modify expectancies more successfully, and subsequently produce greater sensitivity to the instruction.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used a reversal instruction to provide a stronger test of the propositional basis of outcomeprimed responding. Participants were instructed that the pictures presented on test signalled which response would not be reinforced. If cue-elicited responding is governed by propositional knowledge, these instructions will reverse the pattern of responding.
The residual cueing effect seen in the instructed group of Experiment 1 was explained in two ways, which each make distinct predictions with respect to the reversal instruction used in the current experiment. Firstly, it is possible that the residual cueing effect seen in Experiment 1 was the result of a propositional process. On this view, the instructions were only weakly effective in reducing participants' beliefs about the role of the reward cues in signalling which R-O contingency would be reinforced, and so the instructions only partially reduced the PIT effect. The reversal instructions used in the current design give very specific propositional directions as to the cues' relations to the response-outcome contingencies, which are the opposite of any ideomotor O-R links that might have been established in training. The propositional approach predicts that the cueing effect will be completely reversed in the instructed group.
By contrast, the dual-system account suggests that an automatic O-R mechanism may have been responsible for the residual cueing effect seen in the instructed group. This predicts that the reversal instructions will produce a partial reversal in responding. The propositional component of the response will reverse, but the automatic component will produce responding in line with the trained contingencies. These two components 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 18 will combine in the instructed group to produce a net effect somewhere between the standard cueing effect and complete reversal.
One last issue that was investigated in Experiment 2 was the temporal delay between picture presentation and opportunity to respond on test. A three second delay was imposed between the stimulus onset and the response prompt in Experiment 1. Of course, such delays are common in the real-world environment. The interval between a smoker noticing a lighter in the office and walking to the newsagent to buy cigarettes, for example, provides ample opportunity for a propositional process to intervene and halt an automatic O-R process. It is possible, however, that cued responding would be less sensitive to instructional manipulations without this forced delay, due to a relative preponderance of the O-R process. Experiment 2 aimed to test this by randomly allocating participants to a slow or fast group, which differed in the length of the delay between the stimulus onset and the required response. As in Experiment 1, the slow group was required to wait for at least 3s after the stimulus onset before making a forced-choice instrumental response. In the fast condition, this duration was reduced to 300ms. Studies in the affective priming literature (e.g., Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001 ) have shown that a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 300ms between the presentation of a prime and the onset of a target is sufficient to observe automatic priming effects (in the sense that they may occur independently of awareness of the priming stimulus). Controlled, propositional processes necessarily require working memory and time (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009 ). Automatic link-based processes, in contrast, can be expected to control behaviour even when time is limited. Consequently, evidence for an O-R link may be more likely to be observed under time constraints. In this case, reversal instructions may have less impact in the fast group, thereby revealing the operation of an O-R link.
Method
The method was the same as Experiment 1, except in the following respects. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 19
Participants
Forty undergraduate psychology students (17 male, 23 female), aged between 18 and 40 (M = 21.69, S.D. = 4.81), completed the experiment in exchange for course credits. There were ten participants per group, with participants randomly allocated to the instruction and speed conditions.
Test phase
In place of the original instructions, the reversal groups were instructed that the "Pictures indicate which arrow key will NOT be rewarded!" This reversal instruction was presented with the main instructions before the test phase, and also at the bottom of the screen throughout testing. In the slow group, pictures presented on test were initially presented on their own for 3s before a response could be made in their presence (as in Experiment 1). For the fast group, the pictures were presented initially for 300ms before response choice was tested.
Results
All participants correctly reported the response-outcome mappings during the contingency knowledge test, suggesting that they had learned the R-O relationships. On this basis, no exclusions were made. Figure 5 shows the percent choice of the beer key according to the stimulus (beer, blank, chocolate), instruction (non-reversal, reversal) and speed (slow, fast) variables. As in Experiment 1, the cueing effect is 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 20 indicated by the extent to which the beer stimulus increased, and the chocolate stimulus decreased, the percentage of beer over chocolate responses (relative to the blank stimulus). The graph suggests that a standard cueing effect was seen in the non-reversal groups, that the reversal instructions fully reversed this pattern and that the speed manipulation did not affect responding. A mixed ANOVA confirmed these impressions. There was no main effect of instruction or speed, Fs < 1. There was also no main effect of stimulus, F < 1, suggesting that, across all groups, participants did not demonstrate any underlying bias towards the cued stimulus (that is, neither the reversal nor non-reversal effect was large enough to generate a main effect of stimulus across the sample as a whole). Most importantly, there was an interaction between stimulus and instruction, F (1, 36) = 50.20, p < .001, suggesting that the cueing effect was sensitive to the reversal instruction. There was no interaction between stimulus and speed, F (1, 36) = 1.05, p > .05, or instruction and speed, F (1, 36) = 3.10, p = .09. In neither instruction group was there an effect of speed (Fs < 1.55, ps > .22), or an interaction between stimulus and speed (Fs < 2.09, ps > .16). Lastly, there was no threeway interaction between stimulus, instruction and speed, F (1.34, 48.31) = 1.07, p > .05.
Test phase
To determine whether the size of the cueing effects were equivalent between the instruction groups, we compared the cueing effects in each condition. For the non-reversal group, the cueing effect was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1 (i.e. the cueing effect represents the increases in percent choice of the cued response above the blank condition). These calculations were reversed for the reversal group such that the overall cueing effect reflects the extent to which cues increased responding for the outcome not signalled by those cues, above the blank condition (i.e. the extent to which responding was consonant with the instructions).
The size of these cueing effects in the reversal (mean=25.94, SEM=6.31) and non-reversal group (mean=33.60, SEM=5.57) did not differ, t (38) = -0.91, p > .05. Furthermore, we used a Bayesian analysis to aid interpretation of this null result. The alternative hypothesis predicts a standard PIT effect in the reversal instruction group, which would be indicated by a significant difference between the sizes of the cueing effects in each condition. According to the alternative hypothesis, the maximum standard cueing effect for the nonreversal group is 50, which would represent a perfect cueing effect. The highest plausible reversed cueing effect for the reversal group is -50, which would also indicate a perfect standard cueing effect (i.e. no 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 23 participants shows that the reversal seen in the instructed group was complete. Furthermore, the reversal instruction was effective in reducing expectancy ratings for the cued outcomes, and these ratings positively correlated with the size of the overall cueing effect. This suggests that cue-elicited responding is governed by propositional beliefs about the role of the stimulus in signalling the status of response-outcome relationships.
Experiment 2 also tested whether shortening the duration between the stimulus onset and the subsequent instrumental response would reduce sensitivity to the reversal instruction, suggesting a greater preponderance of O-R automaticity in this condition. We found no evidence of this. Participants in the instructed groups showed an effect of stimulus in the opposite direction to the non-instructed groups, both in the slow and fast condition. It might be argued that this null effect was a result of a lack of power to detect an effect of delay.
However, the comparison of the slow and fast reversal cueing effects was far from significant in the present data set, and it seems unlikely that greater power would radically change the pattern of data. Furthermore, the Bayesian analysis provided substantial support for the null hypothesis. Finally, the speed manipulation did not have any significant impact on the size of the cueing effect seen in the non-reversal group. Together, these results suggest that propositional processes facilitate cue-elicited responding.
General Discussion
The current experiments tested the propositional nature of cue-elicited instrumental responding through the use of instructional manipulations. Experiment 1 showed a reduction in outcome-primed responding following instructions that the pictures did not indicate which response would be rewarded. This replicates previous reports (Hogarth et al., 2014, Experiment 3) and suggests that instrumental responding is governed by propositional beliefs about the discriminative or hierarchical function of the stimulus in signalling the efficacy of the response-outcome relation. Furthermore, the cueing effect was entirely abolished in participants who reported no expectancy that the cues signalled the effective R-O relation. This also replicates the sub-group 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 24 analysis of Hogarth et al. (2014) . The only divergence was the failure of instructions to significantly reduce participants' self-reported expectancies that cues signalled the effective R-O relation. This discrepancy may be due to insensitivity of the continuous self-report measure in the current experiment compared to binary measure obtained in Hogarth et al. (2014) .
Experiment 2 used a reversal instruction that was more effective in altering participants' beliefs about the signalling function of cues. Both the PIT effect and the expectancy ratings were highly sensitive to this instruction, suggesting that they are mediated by controlled processes. This instructional sensitivity was demonstrated regardless of whether a long or short delay was imposed prior to the response choice, despite there being a priori reason to anticipate preponderance of automaticity in the short condition (e.g., Hermans et al., 2001) . Furthermore, in both Experiments 1 and 2, the size of the cueing effect correlated with self-reported expectations that the cue signalled which response would be rewarded. Together, these results suggest that, at least in O-R paradigms, performance is dominated by controlled reasoning processes 1 .
This strong conclusion may be questioned by proponents of the dual-system view on two grounds. Firstly, some might argue that the instructional effects seen in the current study are also consistent with a link-based mechanism. That is, a model might be proposed in which verbal instructions can impact on the expression of associative links stored in memory. In Experiment 2, therefore, the instructions may have served to reverse the manner in which the associative links translated (automatically) into choice behaviour. It is not clear, however, that this is truly a dual-process model. If the automatic component can serve as an input into controlled processes, prior to the response being made, then that mechanism is not able to produce responses in an automatic fashion. Alternatively, some have proposed a more radical view in which language itself is linkbased (in the sense used by associative learning theorists). It could be argued then, that because both the instructions and the postulated R-O links are represented in the same way, the fact that they interact with each 1 It is possible that cueing effects (e.g., PIT) seen in non-human animals are the consequence of quite different psychological processes from those revealed in the current experiments. The current data do not speak to the issue of species generality . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Extinction of cue-evoked drug-seeking relies on degrading hierarchical instrumental expectancies.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 59, 61-70. doi: 10.1016 /j.brat.2014 .06.001 Hogarth, L., & Troisi II, J. R. (2015 . A hierarchical instrumental decision theory of nicotine dependence. In:
The neurobiology and genetics of nicotine and tobacco. Springer International Publishing, pp. 165-191. Holland, P. C. (2004 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 37 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Propositional cue-control 38 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 58 59 Figure 3 . The percent choice of the beer key in each instruction and expectancy sub-group. Participants reporting a high expectation (scores greater than four) were allocated to the high-expectancy group, while all others were assigned to the low-expectancy group. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 58 59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 58 59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 58 59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 59 60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
